implement a remedy for segregation in schooling and housing in Yonkers, New York. After protracted litigation, extending over eight years, Judge Sand ordered members of the City Council, on pain of fine and imprisonment, to enact legislation required by a consent decree.' When the Council rejected the legislation, Judge Sand imposed the penalties on the Council members who voted against the legislation, and the Second Circuit affirmed. 9 The Supreme Court stayed the contempt orders 1 " and subsequently agreed to review the sanctions."
Jenkins concerns the means employed by Judge Russell Clark to finance a school desegregation plan in Kansas City, Missouri. When the school district failed to obtain funding for a court-ordered desegregation plan, Judge Clark ordered an increase in the local property tax and imposed a surtax on the state income tax for income earned within the district. 2 While the Eighth Circuit overturned the income tax order, finding it too great a break from existing methods of school finance, it affirmed the property tax surcharge. Ct. 1337 Ct. (1989 . Judge Sand also levied contempt fines against the City of Yonkers which began at one dollar and doubled each day. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., No. 80-6761 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1988) (finding City of Yonkers in contempt). The Second Circuit affirmed these fines as well, although it ruled that they should double only until reaching one million dollars per day and then continue at that level until the required legislation was adopted. United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1339 Ct. (1989 .
10. Spallone v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 14 (1988) . 11. Spallone v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 1337 Ct. (1989 . The Court granted certiorari even though in the face of bankrupting fines against the City of Yonkers, which the Supreme Court refused to stay, the Council members eventually did pass the required resolution. The Council members each paid a total of $3500 in contempt fines for the period between the contempt order on August 2, 1988 and the Second Circuit's stay on August 9, 1988 Ct. 1930 Ct. (1989 . Judge Clark imposed the taxes directly, without legislative action, and ordered state and county tax officials to collect them. 672 F. Supp. at 412-13.
13. 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1930 Ct. (1989 .
These cases illustrate two related approaches to overcoming legislative obstruction. The court can either order legislators to enact certain bills or can circumvent the legislative process and create legislation by judicial decree. Both of these options entail a court's apparent arrogation of traditionally legislative authority; both substitute the judge's decision as to the positive content of the law for that of the legislature. This Note terms a court order that serves to create legislation without any intervening legislative discretion a "legislative injunction." A legislative injunction either compels, or substitutes for, the enactment of a specific bill. 14 This Note considers the use of the legislative injunction as a means to counteract unconstitutional legislative inaction. Courts have become accustomed to nullifying unconstitutional legislative action through the mechanism of judicial review. Counteracting unconstitutional legislative inaction through a legislative injunction, however, appears to be a much greater violation of legislative prerogative. As the City Council members argued in Yonkers, a court's threat to jail legislators unless they vote for a particular bill seems at odds with well established principles of legislative privilege." Similarly, a court's assumption of the taxing power appears to be an arrogation of traditionally legislative authority. 1 " This Note argues that the legislative injunction is a legitimate exercise of judicial authority, indeed as legitimate as a court's overturning unconstitutional legislation through judicial review. The legislative injunction accords with the understanding of the legislative role as deciding on the general distribution of rights and resources and the judicial role as ensur-14. Structural injunctions often substitute for legislative action in the sense that the remedies they mandate could also have been enacted by a legislative body. Changing prison conditions or regulating mental health care, for example, lie within the scope of the legislative power. However, the activities that the court wishes to reform normally come under the routine supervision of administrative bodies, and it is with these kinds of administrative operations that the court's order is normally concerned. By contrast, the legislative injunction, as discussed in this Note, involves functions centrally identified with legislative bodies, functions such as enacting legislation or raising funds that do not lend themselves to administrative delegation. 15. This Note will limit its focus to use of the legislative injunction by Federal courts against state and local legislatures, which is the most common framework for structural litigation. The Note will not examine the use of legislative injunctions by state courts, nor will it consider the special concerns implicated in directing judicial decrees at the United States Congress.
16 ing that this allocation is accomplished fairly, without prejudicing the rights of particular groups or individuals. The legislative injunction responds to a situation, such as a segregated school or an inhumane prison, in which legislative inaction will cause a deprivation of constitutional rights. By mandating a particular action, the court assures that the legislature cannot exercise its "discretion" not to act and thereby impair individuals' constitutional rights. This role for the court in defining the bounds of legislative discretion falls squarely within the traditional understanding of judicial authority.
Nor does the legislative injunction conflict with legislative immunity doctrine. In deciding the proper scope of legislative immunity, courts have developed an understanding of the proper domain of discretion in order to distinguish those acts of legislators that are truly "legislative," hence shielded by immunity, from those that are "non-legislative" and do not enjoy this protection. Building on this distinction, the Note finds the legitimacy of legislative injunctions well grounded in immunity law principles. By their very nature, legislative injunctions usurp no legitimate legislative power. Instead they give expression to the evolving constitutional boundaries of legislative discretion, refusing to treat inaction as a privileged exercise of legislative authority. By contrast, a formal view of legislative prerogative which rejects the legislative injunction declares that not the Constitution, but the status quo, is supreme.
Section I explores the need for legislative injunctions and examines prior court decisions addressing the confrontation of legislatures and courts in structural litigation. Section II considers the development of legislative immunity doctrine with particular attention to the policy/implementation and the discretionary/ministerial distinctions that have developed in legislative immunity law. Section III expands on these immunity doctrines to develop a theory of legislative injunctions as tools to ensure that legislators do not deprive individuals of constitutional rights by failing to perform constitutionally mandated duties.
I. LEGISLATIVE RESISTANCE AND JUDICIAL REACTION
Although Federal courts enjoy broad equitable powers to fashion remedies for constitutional violations, 18 they may have difficulty implementing their decrees without the compliance of state and local legislatures. The most common area in which legislative assistance is required is in the financing of remedial orders. Whether they seek to improve prison conditions, reform mental hospitals, or desegregate schools, structural remedies inevitably involve increased spending, and the appropriation power has a strong historical and constitutional tie to the legislature. 9 Remedial orders may also require other kinds of enabling acts, such as zoning changes, which are within the traditionally legislative sphere of authority. Whether based on principled disagreement or mere parsimony, legislatures are not always willing to enact the necessary legislation.
When courts have come into conflict with legislatures, the Supreme Court has generally refused to allow claims of autonomy to prevent the implementation of constitutional remedies. Since Brown v. Board of Education, 20 conflicts between courts and legislatures have often arisen in the context of school desegregation decisions. The Supreme Court has suggested that courts may indeed order local bodies to levy taxes if necessary to ensure compliance with a prior remedial order. When a school board in Prince Edward County, Virginia, closed the public schools to avoid a desegregation decree, while providing tax incentives to private, segregated schools, the Court in Griffin v. County School Board 2 stated that the district court could order the school supervisors to levy the taxes required to re-open the schools and to run them without racial discrimination. 2 2
The lower Federal courts have disagreed on how broadly to interpret the Supreme Court's warrant for interfering in local taxing decisions. 2 " Generally, courts have insisted that judges show all possible deference to local revenue processes, intervening only as a last resort. In Evans v. Buchanan, 24 for example, the Third Circuit reviewed a judge's decision overturning a legislatively-established tax rate that he believed inadequate to fund a desegregation remedy. While not reaching the merits of the district court's order, the Third Circuit granted a writ of mandamus vacating the order and requiring a new hearing on the grounds that the lower court refused to give a presumption of constitutionality to the legislative action. The Third Circuit objected to the district judge's failing to show "the requisite deference to which legislative judgments in the field of taxation are entitled." '2 5 When alternatives have been exhausted, courts have used Griffin to justify ordering tax increases. The Eighth Circuit has been particularly willto the chamber closest to the people. U.S. CONST CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
32.
The Liddell court specifically relied on Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. Mayor of New Orleans, 215 U.S. 170 (1909), in which the Supreme Court held that a court could order a city to levy and collect a tax for the benefit of creditors who had been promised the tax revenues. The City of New Orleans had attempted to avoid honoring a judgment that resulted from a contractual obligation to pay certain tax revenues to the metropolitan police board. The Supreme Court ruled that the city could be required "to pay over the taxes for which the judgment was rendered, or to levy and collect a tax therefor." 215 U.S. at 181. [Vol. 99: 231 lative cooperation in implementing a remedy resulting from a consent judgment, rather than from a finding of liability." 6 This general judicial reluctance to enforce consent judgments becomes particularly pronounced when the legislature is not a formal party to the settlement. In these circumstances courts are hesitant to impute an affirmative duty to the legislature to fund the agreed upon measures.
Despite a consent judgment entered into by the Governor of New York, for example, the state legislature refused to provide funding for a plan to remedy unconstitutional conditions at the Willowbrook mental institution." 7 The Second Circuit ruled that the district court could not coerce compliance by holding the Governor and Comptroller in contempt. 3 8 The district court apparently did not attempt to order legislative compliance directly, but the Second Circuit opinion seemed to foreclose such an action, warning that a court should not put itself " 'in the difficult position of trying to enforce a direct order . . . to raise and allocate large sums of money,. . . steps traditionally left to appropriate executive and legislative bodies responsible to the voters.' "" The court stressed its belief that the legislature was not guilty of a constitutional violation and therefore was not subject to the broad remedial power of the court. 40 The Second Circuit reached this conclusion despite the long history of horrendous conditions at the state-run Willowbrook facility. The Second Circuit thus tacitly blessed a pas de deux in which the Governor claimed that legislative inaction rendered his compliance impossible, while the legislature had no affirmative obligation to facilitate an agreement to which it was not a formal party.' 1 In Brewster v. Dukakis,' 2 the First Circuit similarly limited the ability of the district court to implement a consent decree concerning the provision of mental health services. When the legislature refused to fund the program that the Governor had promised in the consent decree, the First Circuit stated that the district court had no remedy against the legislature and that, in seeking to fund the program, the district court could not go beyond requiring the executive to exercise the "best efforts" demanded by the consent decree. 4 
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trying to implement consent decrees to remedy unconstitutional prison conditions."" In sum, when long-standing legislative inaction directly violates a court's remedial order issued after a finding of a constitutional violation, courts have generally assumed broad powers to force legislative compliance. When, instead, there has been no judicial determination of liability and the legislative inaction violates no direct judicial order, courts are wary of coercing legislative cooperation. This insistence on a formal declaration of liability represents judges' justifiable reluctance to arrogate apparently legislative functions without a clear determination of official dereliction of duty. An agreement between two parties may well not provide a sufficient foundation for ordering the enactment of a specific bill or for circumventing the legislature altogether.' 5 Courts have thus even been willing to arrogate part of the legislature's taxing and spending power, though only after a particular constitutional violation has received judicial definition. In their role as guarantors of constitutional rights, courts have found justification for altering the general principle that appropriations decisions must rest with the people's elected representatives.
II. LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY
The doctrine of legislative immunity represents an area in which courts have been particularly sympathetic to claims of legislative autonomy. This Section argues, however, that the legislative injunction accords with existing legislative immunity doctrine, as well as with the justifications underlying the general policy of immunity for public officials. Indeed, legislative immunity decisions elaborate a functional definition of legislative conduct that provides support for a court's assertion of power through a legislative injunction. As the cases make clear, legislative immunity does not exempt all conduct by legislators from judicial scrutiny.
Legislative immunity doctrine in the United States rests on vestiges of English tradition, deference to the people's democratically elected representatives, and more general principles of official immunity. An inheritance of the struggles in England between the Crown and Parliament,"' legislative immunity has a long history in America. Most Colonial constitutions provided for legislative privilege, and that right was strongly defended as a sign of Colonial independence in the face of conflict with Crown governors. 7 The Federal Constitution seeks to protect legislative independence by guaranteeing freedom from civil arrest"" and freedom of speech and debate 9 to members of Congress. 50 While the Constitution provides no specific immunity for state legislators, the Supreme Court held in Tenney v. Brandhove that state legislators enjoyed a common law immunity that shielded them from Federal civil rights suits. 5 1 The Court found that Congress could not have intended to abrogate traditional legislative immunity when it enacted the civil rights legislation in the postCivil War era. 5 2 In 1979, The Court extended this immunity to "regional" legislators. In Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 53 local property owners attempted to sue members of the governing board of the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, alleging that a land use ordinance deprived them of the beneficial use of their property. The Court held that the members of the board of the bi-state agency were absolutely immune if they were acting in a legislative capacity. While the Court's opinion expressly left open the issue of extending a similar immunity to local legislators, 54 its reasoning seemed to demand such an extension. The opinion emphasized the special status of legislative activity with little reference to its level of operation. 5 51. 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951). Brandhove, a critic of the California Senate Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities, claimed that the committee and its chairman had deprived him of his civil rights through various acts of harassment. The Supreme Court ruled that the committee and its members were absolutely immune from such a suit, provided that they "were acting in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity." Id.
52. Justice Frankfurter expressed this view by way of a forceful rhetorical question: "Did Congress by the general language of its 1871 statute mean to overturn the tradition of legislative freedom achieved in England by Civil War and carefully preserved in the formation of State and National Governments here?" 341 U.S. at 376.
For a discussion of common law legislative immunity in suits brought under 42 U. The official immunity strain of legislative immunity is strong, with courts being primarily concerned that the exercise of legislative power not be hampered by threat of lawsuit. 5 " Justice Frankfurter explained in Tenney that legislative privilege was meant to protect the "public good," as fear of legal retribution might hamper the "uninhibited discharge" of legislative duty." 8 Even claims of "unworthy purpose" should not defeat the privilege, Frankfurter argued, because the need to defend oneself in court would create a distraction from legislative business. 59 The use of the legislative injunction in situations such as those in Yonkers and Jenkins poses no threat to general official immunity policies. In those cases, the legislative injunction followed a judicial finding that instrumentalities of the state government had violated the Constitution. Once a court has found the governmental body liable for unconstitutional practices, official immunity principles do not reach the conduct of officials who impede a judge's remedial orders. Defending themselves in court against aggrieved constituents might interfere with legislators' performance of their official duties, but answering to a Federal judge seeking to remedy a proven constitutional violation hardly impedes legitimate public functions.
General official immunity principles, however, do not fully express the special deference for legislators recognized in legislative immunity doctrine. The immunity that the Court has defined for legislators extends beyond that granted to other government officials. Most public officials are shielded only by a conditional, "good faith," immunity. Judges do enjoy absolute immunity, but only against claims for damages. Legislative immunity, on the other hand, covers claims for damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees. 60 Even this broad doctrinal protection recognizes some limits on legislative independence. To qualify for immunity, an act must fall within the [Vol. 99: 231 sphere of legitimate legislative activity. 6 1 The Supreme Court has adopted a "functional" approach in addressing issues of official immunity, 2 and courts have generally not been deferential to the formal appearance of legislative activity in defining the scope of local legislative immunity.S In deciding questions of local legislative immunity in Federal civil rights cases, courts have often sought to determine whether an action is legislative, hence immunized, by reference to the underlying substantive issue, rather than to the nominal character of the decision-making body. Courts have limited legislative immunity to actions of a general, policy-setting nature. Legislators have not enjoyed immunity for decisions directed to a more particular, individualized result, especially when the action prejudices the rights of one specific individual or group.
In Cutting v. Muzzey," which concerned a town planning board's consideration of a subdivision plan, the First Circuit analyzed decisions by a local body based on the nature of the underlying facts and on the particularity of the impact. If the decision rested on general policy determinations and did not seek to single out individuals, then it was considered to be legislative. If the decision was more specific in purpose and effect, it was deemed not legislative, but administrative. Official decisions of the same body performed according to the same formal process could thus be legislative or non-legislative, depending upon the subject of the action.
Other courts have made a similar distinction between legislative acts which set public policy priorities and administrative actions which do not express the legislative prerogative to assert general policy goals. 6 491 (1975) , have been held to be absolutely protected without regard to the content of the action. In Kilbourn, the Court indicated that some congressional conduct might be so outrageous as to be unprotected by the speech or debate clause:
It is not necessary to decide here that there may not be things done, in the one House or the other, of an extraordinary character, for which the members who take part in the act may be held legally responsible. If we could suppose the members of these bodies so far to forget their high functions and the noble instrument under which they act as to imitate the Long Parliament in the execution of the Chief Magistrate of the nation, or to follow the example of the French Assembly in assuming the function of a court for capital punishment we are not prepared to say that such an utter perversion of their powers to a criminal purpose would be screened from punishment by the constitutional provision for freedom of debate. 103 U.S. at 204-05. The Court has apparently never invoked this "regicide-or-its-moral-equivalent" exception.
64 actions a legislature takes come within the bounds of traditional legislative discretion. The legislative injunction develops the analogous principle that the failure to take certain actions also falls outside the realm of legitimate legislative prerogative.
The extent to which prior court action defining particular duties may transform a legislative into a non-legislative decision has not been addressed in recent immunity decisions. This issue did arise, though was not resolved, early in this century in Virginia v. West Virginia. 8 In this case, which came before the Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction, Virginia sought to have the Court force West Virginia to pay its share of the debt that existed before the states split. In its argument before the Court, Virginia asserted that since a judgment had been entered against West Virginia, the legislature of West Virginia had assumed a duty to take the steps necessary to appropriate the required funds. Although the Court could not compel the exercise of discretion, Virginia argued, the Court could order the performance of a non-discretionary task by the legislature. While the necessary action might appear to be within the protected sphere of legislative prerogative, in fact the legislature had an "absolute ministerial duty" 69 to comply with the prior court order. In its decision, the Supreme Court contented itself with expressing the general right of Federal courts to enforce judgments against states, and subsequent compliance by West Virginia relieved the Court of the obligation to specify what kind of judicial order would be appropriate.
III. THE LEGITIMACY OF LEGISLATIVE INJUNCTIONS
The premise of the legislative injunction is that the court has determined that the Constitution requires certain legislative actions and that the legislature has nevertheless refused to comply. Only when the legislature has failed to abide by a clear definition of a constitutional duty does the court take the step of directly ordering the legislature to enact a par- 
A. The Examples of Yonkers and Jenkins
The extent of legislative defiance confronting Judge Sand in Yonkers was extreme. The underlying lawsuit had been filed more than seven years earlier, and almost three years had passed since he had found the City of Yonkers liable for intentional segregation in schooling and in housing. 1 After prolonged resistance to a Housing Remedy Order entered by the court, 72 the City Council had finally approved a consent decree in January 1988.
7 3 The consent judgment included an agreement to adopt legislation providing for zoning changes. It was the refusal to enact this promised legislation that finally triggered the direct court order and, eventually, the imposition of contempt sanctions on the Council members who refused to vote in favor of the required resolution.
The Yonkers case represents the paradigmatic instance in which a legislative injunction infringes on no legitimate legislative prerogative. In response to a finding of constitutional violation, the City Council had previously agreed to enact the specific resolution that was the subject of Judge Sand's order. The City Council members had clearly already exercised all permissible discretion. The act of passing the zoning changes in these circumstances resembled more the ministerial performance of a well-defined legal obligation than the discretionary outcome of legislative deliberation. While the prior consent decree made the lack of legislative discretion particularly clear in this instance, in fact the discretion of state and local legislators is always limited by the requirements of the Constitution. 74 In Jenkins, Judge Clark similarly resorted to a legislative injunction only after the regular political process had been exhausted. The Kansas City, Missouri School District had presented to the voters a bond issue and, on four separate occasions, a tax increase plan, but the voters rejected 73. In Yonkers, unlike some of the suits discussed in Section I, the consent judgment concerned only the remedy phase of the litigation, which followed an adjudication of liability for constitutional violations.
74 each proposal. 5 The state legislature had also refused to help the school district raise the necessary funds. 78 It was following the failure of these conventional methods that Judge Clark imposed the tax directly, emphasizing that the court-ordered tax hike was only a measure of last resort. He stressed that he was "reluctant" 77 to order a tax, but that the legislative and popular resistance left him with no choice, for "a majority has no right to deny others the constitutional guarantees to which they are entitled." 78 In these circumstances, he believed that he had "no alternative but to impose tax measures."' 7 Again, the Federal court intervened in the local governmental process after first clearly defining the constitutional requirements and allowing the legislature an opportunity to comply voluntarily.
The choice of a particular taxing scheme clearly does implicate larger policy concerns. However, given a finding of constitutional necessity, the legislature had discretion only to choose among various revenue schemes; it did not have discretion to adopt no fundraising plan. Judge Clark's decrees did not arrogate legislative authority, but rather sought to cabin legislative prerogative within constitutional bounds. The legislature had discretion to decide how to raise revenues, but not whether to do so. A variety of legislative alternatives conformed to the constitutional mandate, but some options did not, and one of these unacceptable actions was to do nothing at all. 80 By threatening to raise revenues himself, and finally ordering a tax, Judge Clark ensured that legislative inaction would not serve as an unreviewable mechanism for thwarting constitutional rights. By changing the background environment confronting the legislature, he transformed the extraordinary situation of a legislature's blocking a remedial order into the "normal" model of judicial review. Any action of the legislature was, as always, subject to judicial oversight, while legislative inaction presented no threat, since the status quo baseline (here, a courtordered tax hike) suffered from no constitutional infirmity. The legislature then had an allowable measure of discretion. By acting or failing to act, it chose between different proposals that did not offend constitutional principles. The very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a statewide public school system suggests that "there will be more than one constitutionally permissible method of solving them," and that, within the limits of rationality, "the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems" should be entitled to respect.
In Jenkins the legislature made essentially no effort to tackle the funding problem.
81. In Evans v. Buchanan, the district judge explicitly invited the legislature to alter the tax rate [Vol.
99: 231
Judge Clark may not have arrived at the specific funding plan that both vindicated constitutional rights and best conformed to the legitimate policy goals of the legislature. 3 2 A judge's inability to account for all the factors that a legislature would normally consider does imply that a legislative injunction has a policy "cost": The judge may not be able to pick the best, by any measure, of the constitutional alternatives available. However, an unwise judicial choice (or even the possibility of one) may spur a reluctant legislature into action. To the extent that legislative action in the first instance is preferable to a legislative injunction, for reasons of institutional competence, democratic accountability, and perhaps symbolic resonance, this kind of "penalty" default rule may even be desirable. 8 "
B. The Limits of the Legislative Injunction
The legislative injunction, like judicial review, is counter-majoritarian in that it places the vindication of constitutional rights above the current will of the citizens and their representatives. Indeed, as an affirmative counter-majoritarian attack on a representative body, the legislative injunction may seem a doubly "deviant" institution in a democracy. 8 4 Inhe had established, so long as the substituted rate provided sufficient funds for the desegregation remedy:
It is with deep seated reluctance overcome only be [sic] the pressing, immediate necessity and the realization that no other option is available to fill the legislative void that the Court becomes involved at all in matters of taxation ... The Court is compelled, however, to order that a tax rate be established. This action is taken with the understanding that the Legislature can alter the parameters authorized. Because state political processes are preferred over even limited intervention by a Federal court, the Delaware Legislature may raise or lower the tax authorization established here. 84. See A. BICKEL, THE LE sT DANGEROUS BRANCH 18 (1962). The legislative injunction does have firm foundations in various theories of judicial review. In line with process-based justifications, such as that of John Hart Ely, the beneficiaries of structural litigation tend to be exactly those persons whose interests are systematically underrepresented in a democracy-prisoners, mental patients, and black schoolchildren, for example. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIStRuST (1980); see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting role for judicial review in correcting flaws in political process). Structural litigation provides remedies for those whose interests are acknowledged to require special protection from legislative action. The legislative injunction recognizes that these same people require special protection from legislative inaction, as well.
The legislative injunction also finds support in recent unapologetic defenses of judicial review as a peculiarly American democratic insight. See Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE. L.J. 1013 (1984) . While the legislative branch generally constitutes the most direct measure of the people's will, in certain situations the courts must step in to assert their mandate to represent the people. In ordering remedies to constitutional violations, the courts speak with the direct authority of (We) the people. The democratic justification for protecting the legislature against the judiciary is at its weakest in such moments. The Constitution, as the highest embodiment of American democratic aspirations, overrides the will of a particular majority at a particular time. This democratic argument for judicial review gains added force when it is a local legislature (or even a local stances may arise in which the legislative inaction that the injunction seeks to overcome runs counter to the desire of the constituents, but the main purpose of the legislative injunction is not to remedy such flaws in the political system. 8 5 The legislative injunction is not a substitute for electoral accountability. Rather, the legislative injunction will most commonly be employed in cases such as Jenkins, in which the legislative inaction may well represent the will of the majority. In Jenkins the legislature merely followed the preferences that the people had expressed in various popular referenda. Such a powerful counter-majoritarian tool must clearly be employed with restraint.
The Yonkers and Jenkins cases help illustrate the limits courts should observe in invoking the legislative injunction. The distinction between settled and adjudicated resolutions discussed earlier 8 6 provides one check on judicial overreaching. Majoritarian concerns may legitimately curb a court's discretion in enforcing a remedy arising from a consent judgment that includes no finding of liability. As this Note argues, the Constitution may well require the displacement of the legislature, but only after a judicial determination of constitutional necessity. Thus, parents of schoolchildren cannot conspire with a sympathetic school board to force a legislature to increase appropriations-unless a court determines that the funds are constitutionally required.
In enforcing legislative injunctions, judges must also exercise care to respect local government structures to as great an extent as possible. While remaining committed to their remedial plans, judges should seek to avoid full-blown confrontations with local officials. In this regard, Judge Clark's plan of decreeing the desired legislative enactment, thus obviating the need to threaten the legislature with contempt sanctions or other coercive measures, seems attractive. Judge Clark would clearly have preferred that the legislature itself act. He did not dispute that appropriation decisions are best made by the people and their representatives, rather than by a judge, but he refused to let deference to legislative discretion paralyze the remedial process.
In Yonkers, Judge Sand followed the more confrontational path of forcing the legislative body to act. [Vol. 99: 231 the plaintiffs in the case, urged Judge Sand to displace the City Council and to appoint a special commission to implement the housing plan rather than to impose contempt sanctions. 8 7 Judge Sand nevertheless persisted in seeking compliance by the Council. Defending this decision, Judge Sand cited a "philosophical or symbolic" justification for his action:
[T]here does have to come a moment of truth, a moment of reckoning, a moment when the City of Yonkers seeks not to become the national symbol of defiance to civil rights and to heap shame upon shame upon itself, but to recognize its obligation to conform to the laws of the land and not step by step, order by order, but in the way in which any responsible community concerned about the welfare of its citizens functions. 8 "
Judge Sand may well have been justified in seeing the capitulation of the Council as an intrinsic part of the process of removing racial discrimination in Yonkers. The conduct of the Council members certainly did challenge the authority of a Federal court in a manner reminiscent of the early school desegregation cases, if on a much smaller scale. Nevertheless, the idea of jailing legislators because they refuse to vote in a particular manner conflicts with deeply held democratic values, as was apparent from the tremendous public attention the Yonkers case received. The large contempt fines levied on the city, which eventually succeeded in coercing passage of the required legislation, raise additional policy questions. By threatening their jobs and services, Judge Sand, in effect, forced the people of Yonkers into obedience. The result of noncompliance was a kind of group punishment. The Yonkers contempt sanctions probably came close to the boundary where coercive measures become in fact the sort of punitive sanctions impermissible in a civil contempt adjudication. 9 Whatever the merits of Judge Sand's actions in Yonkers, it will clearly be only the rare case in which this use of enormous contempt sanctions will prove desirable. More often, circumventing the legislative process will prove more efficient and more equitable. It is one thing to place the principles of If a judgment directs a party . . . to perform any . . . specific act and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be done 
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The Yale Law Journal the Constitution above the current will of the majority; it is another matter to try to change that will by contempt orders.
C. Affirmative Duties in an Activist State
Commentators sometimes distinguish between a "negative" and a "positive" conception of constitutional rights." The negative view insists that the Constitution seeks to protect individual freedom by shielding the citizen from government overreaching. This conception emphasizes the danger of the legislature's meddling in affairs beyond the scope of its legitimate authority. As one nineteenth-century source expresses this sentiment, "No man's life, liberty or property are safe while the Legislature is in session.91 A more recent statement of the negative rights position appears in an opinion by Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit: "[Tlhe Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties. The men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that Government might do too little for the people but that it might do too much to them." 9 2 Positive rights theorists, by contrast, find in the Constitution a mandate for government intervention to secure individual liberty. They argue for an affirmative government obligation to provide for basic needs, such as education and a minimum income. 9 3
The Supreme Court has recognized positive government duties in certain situations. 9 " The Court, for example, has determined that the Sixth Amendment 9 5 provides an affirmative right to be represented by counsel and a concomitant positive duty to provide legal assistance to indigent defendants." The Court has also ruled that a state has an obligation to provide means for parties to protect their constitutional rights. In Truax v. Corrigan, 97 the Court held that a state could not prohibit injunctions against striking workers, since to do so would be to leave owners unable to vindicate the right of free access to their property. As these cases illustrate, however, the Supreme Court has generally inferred affirmative obligations 90. For a discussion of the distinction between positive and negative rights, see I. This Note has considered the use of the legislative injunction in the remedy phase of constitutional litigation. Yonkers and Jenkins illustrate that while the legislative injunction seeks to enforce affirmative legislative duties, its legitimacy does not depend upon a theory of positive constitutional rights. In accordance with a negative understanding of rights, the legislative injunction may function simply to protect individuals against unjust government coercion. In Yonkers and Jenkins, government officials had engaged in racial discrimination, and legislative action was required to reverse the effects of this prior wrongdoing. However broadly one views the mandate for state action, the government certainly has an obligation to rectify its own improper acts.
The insight motivating the legislative injunction-that inaction does not constitute a privileged mode of government conduct-does suggest, though, the weakness of the negative rights model. The courts in Jenkins and Yonkers had explicitly held that the existing patterns of school segregation resulted from illegitimate state action. But state power is already implicated in any existing social setting.' To understand the Constitution as a shield against government interference is to naturalize the status quo, preferring the beneficiaries of past state intervention to the petitioners of the present. Especially in the wake of the New Deal and the increasingly activist character of the modern administrative state, it is disingenuous for government to deny responsibility for the current distribution of resources."' 1 Since common law baselines represent prior exercises of state power, not neutral, apolitical starting points, the insistence of the negative rights model that it is government action, not inaction, that threatens individuals' liberty rings false.
10 2 The lessons of Yonkers and Jenkins have broad application: Courts cannot permit government inaction to preserve the pernicious effects of prior government activity. Whatever the terms employed to describe the contemporary understanding of the role of rights in regulating the interaction of individuals and the state, it is clear that legislative inaction should have no privileged place. Recognizing the theoretical limitations of the negative rights model, courts may discover unconstitutional legislative inaction in less obvious circumstances than the blatant and longstanding disregard for a school desegregation remedy. If courts take a more expansive view of the rights protected by the Constitution, conflicts between courts and legislatures may escalate. In addition to helping to demonstrate the limitations of the negative conception of rights, then, the legislative injunction may also become an increasingly important constitutional tool.
IV. CONCLUSION
Over the past twenty-five years, structural litigations have sought to protect those who require affirmative governmental action to prevent the deprivation of their life, liberty, or property. As a result of this development, an anomaly has arisen in that the vindication of constitutional rights may seem to depend on the will of the majority as expressed through the legislature. This appearance must be deceptive, since it is the very nature of rights that they do not depend on the current preferences of the people, that they stand above the vagaries of majority rule. In sum, a fundamental aspect of constitutional rights is that they are not subject to legislative discretion. By employing the legislative injunction to guarantee constitutional rights, judges are thus not usurping legislative authority. Rather, they are creating a new, constitutional baseline, so that the legislators' exercise of discretion, be it through action or inaction, will not exceed their prerogative by violating constitutional guarantees. It is basic to the American constitutional system that legislative power is limited. The legislative injunction ensures that these limits are set not by the status quo, but by the Constitution.
cases involving the imposition of "affirmative" duties on government. The protection of the trespass laws is thus generally perceived as a negative guarantee, whereas protection of welfare rights is viewed as a positive one. Distinctions of this sort turn not on a genuine inquiry into the negative or positive character of the rights, but on whether they require the government to depart from common law categories.
Id. at 503 (footnote omitted).
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